EUA trató de detener expulsión de Zelaya

Roberto Micheletti, entonces presidente del Congreso Nacional de Honduras, lo tomó como una deferencia. Llamaba para informar que se votaría en el pleno la destitución del presidente hondureño Manuel “Mel” Zelaya.

Hugo Llorens, embajador de Estados Unidos, tomó la llamada como una advertencia de que se pondría en peligro el orden constitucional de este país centroamericano y abogó ante Micheletti porque se frenara toda acción del Congreso en ese sentido.

La recomendación hecha por Llorens es parte de lo relatado por el embajador en el cable 214237, catalogado como “Confidencial” y girado a Washington D.C. a las 8:11 de la mañana del 26 de junio de 2009.

Según relata el embajador, quien firma la correspondencia, “la noche del 25 de junio, el Congreso Nacional estuvo a punto de llevar a votación la destitución del presidente Zelaya”. La acción fue tildada por Llorens como “precipitada” porque podría “sumir a Honduras en una profunda crisis constitucional”.

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date: 6/26/2009 20:11
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000501

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CEN
WHA/FO FOR A/S SHANNON AND DAS DAVE ROBINSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, HO
SUBJECT: CONGRESS PULLS BACK FROM THE BRINK ON REMOVING
PRESIDENT ZELAYA

TEGUCIGALP 00000501 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b & d).

1. (C) Summary: On the evening of June 25, the National
Congress came close to bringing to the floor a vote on the
removal of President Zelaya from office. The Ambassador
strongly advised Congress President Micheletti against such
hasty action that could plunge Honduras into a deeper
constitutional crisis. Other senior politicians also worked
behind-the-scenes to push Congress back from the brink. In
the end, congressional leaders backed away from the vote and
limited themselves to launching an inquiry into legal
violations that may have been committed by President Zelaya
and his Administration. Supreme Court President Rivera told
us that Congress does not have the power to impeach the
President, since the repeal of such a law in 2005.
Currently, the only means to remove a sitting President is
through the filing of a criminal case filed by the Public
Ministry with the Supreme Court itself. End Summary.

2. (C) On the evening of June 25, Congress President Robert
Micheletti called the Ambassador to inform him that with the
strong support of the Honduran political parties (including
the two major parties ) Liberal and National), the National
Congress had begun a formal debate to consider removing
President Zelaya from office. Micheletti said that Congress
would deliberate and review legal violations committed by the
President and his Administration during his term of office.
He said that the President's illegal decision to fire Armed
Forces Chief Romeo Vasquez had been the immediate catalyst of
the Congressional action. He said he believed that he had
the votes to take this definitive action against the
President. Micheletti said he wanted the United States to be
informed of the Congressional deliberations and likely
action. The Ambassador responded that while the USG had
great respect for the Honduran Congress and would not ever
attempt to tell the sovereign legislators what they should
do, our view was that this action seemed totally premature,
was dangerous and could precipitate a major constitutional
crisis in Honduras with uncertain results. The Ambassador
spoke of the high tension prevailing in the country and said
the potential for social conflict and violence was high. Any
hasty action by the Congress against a democratically-elected
President was an extremely serious matter that could be
viewed in a very critical manner by many in the international
community. The Ambassador also noted that the OAS's
Permanent Council was scheduled to discuss and debate the
situation in Honduras tomorrow. He noted that while some
people in the country were unsatisfied by the GOH's
manipulation of the OAS's role in the June 28 poll, OAS
involvement could be supportive of finding a legal,
constitutional and peaceful way out of the crisis.

3. (C) Micheletti responded that President Zelaya was bent on
bringing down the democratic system in Honduras. He noted
that earlier that day Zelaya had threatened to shutdown the
Congress and to put him in jail. He said that Zelaya had
completely alienated the Honduran Congress and that the
President had virtually no/no support. Micheletti
appreciated the Ambassador's honest advice but felt that the
moment for decision had arrived. The Ambassador again warned
that such rash action could result in incalculably negative
consequences in Honduras and advised patience and calm.
Later the Ambassador made calls to several key Liberal Party
leaders including Presidential candidate Elvin Santos and
Former President Carlos Flores and conveyed our concern about
the ongoing deliberations in Congress. Both agreed that
Congress' action seemed rash and irrational, but both said
that Zelaya's increasing radical rhetoric and actions, his
willingness to push for a poll that was clearly illegal, and
his firing of the military high command had alienated the

TEGUCIGALP 00000501 002.2 OF 002


Congress. However, Santos and Flores said they were also
trying to influence key congressional leaders, including
Micheletti (who both described as stubborn), and would
continue to make calls that evening. Later that evening we
learned that following private consultations between the
leaders of the different parties and delegations, an
agreement was reached to avoid a floor vote on whether to
remove the President. Instead, Congress voted to launch an
investigation of the President's misdeeds with the purpose of
considering some future action by the Congress.

4. (C) In a meeting on June 25, Honduran Supreme Court
President Jorge Rivera Aviles told the Ambassador that he was
extremely worried about the planned Congressional action
against the President. Rivera said that congressional
leaders had approached him about their plans to remove the
President. Rivera said he advised against such action, which
he described as illegal. Rivera said that in 2005 the
Congress had repealed the impeachment law. Currently the
only means to remove a President was through the filing of a
criminal case by the Public Ministry (Attorney General) with
the Supreme Court. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court
would appoint a Supreme Court Magistrate to hear the case. A
ruling by the Magistrate against the President represented
the only means to legally separate him/her from the office.
Rivera said the Public Ministry might opt to move against
Zelaya if he goes forward with direct support for the June
28, which a judge has ruled as illegal.

5. (C) Comment: Zelaya's decision to fire General Vasquez
has further polarized Honduras and has radicalized
anti-Zelaya sentiment in Congress and many public
institutions including the judiciary and the armed forces.
Fortunately, the decision by congressional leaders to pull
back from the brink of a constitutional crisis provides a
reprieve that hopefully can help ease the tensions from their
current fever pitch. In a conversation with the Ambassador
on June 25, Zelaya seemed to be more aware of his increasing
isolation and vulnerability. The Ambassador took the
opportunity to encourage him to do use his role as President
of "all Hondurans" to do everything he could to lower the
tensions and send conciliatory public messages, and engage in
dialogue with the opposition.
LLORENS =======================CABLE ENDS============================

Según el cable 212871, el embajador dijo a los dos jefes militares que el gobierno de Estados Unidos y la comunidad internacional condenarían cualquier movimiento inconstitucional contra Zelaya y que hacerlo representaría un retraso de varios años para la institución castrense.

Dd: 212871
date: 6/18/2009 17:17
refid: 09TEGUCIGALPA474
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classification: CONFIDENTIAL
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000474

SIPDIS

WHA/CEN DAS DAVE ROBINSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, HO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WARNS HONDURAN MILITARY ON COUP RUMORS

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 465 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reason 1.4 (B&D)

1. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, hosted Honduran
Military Joint Chief Romeo Vazquez Velasquez and Deputy Chief
Miguel Garcia Padgett for breakfast on June 18 and conveyed
in the strongest terms USG concerns about rumors that the
military would move against the government if Honduran
politicians did not reach a consensus on the legality of poll
on a referendum for a constituent assembly to rewrite the
constitution (reftel). The Ambassador told the two military
leaders that the &heavens would fall8 if the military made
any unconstitutional move, that the USG and international
community would condemn them and that democracy in Honduras
and the military as an institution would be set back for
years. Vazquez assured the Ambassador that the military
would not make any move against the government, though
admitting that they had privately threatened to do so in
order to put pressure on politicians to reach a consensus.

2. (C) Rumors have been circulating for more than a week that
the military had threatened political leaders with action
&to restore democracy8 if an agreement was not reached on
the poll issue. The military is under pressure on the issue
as President Manuel &Mel8 Zelaya has ordered them to
provide logistical support for the poll while an appellate
court has ordered the poll illegally, and threatened any
government agency that supports it with legal action.
Military leaders have therefore told senior politicians from
both of Honduras, two major political parties that if a
resolution is not found they may have to take unspecified
action against the Zelaya government. (Note: Senior
Honduran military officers have told DATT that they would
consider creating an &administrative junta8 until elections
are held in December for a new president and congress. In
these meetings we have also made clear that such action would
be totally unacceptable to the U.S.) 3. (C) Vasquez admitted to the Ambassador that these threats
had been made, but said that their purpose was to prod
politicians into reaching an agreement. Vazquez described
the military's situation as intolerable, with being told by
their commander-in-chief to carry out an order while being
told by a court that order was illegal. Nevertheless he
denied any intention to actually take action and assured the
Ambassador that the military would never do anything that was
not/not supported by the USG. Besides telling Vasquez that
any unconstitutional action would be unacceptable, the
Ambassador urged patience, telling him that we were in
contact with Zelaya and senior Honduran politicians (to be
reported septel) and that there was a possibility of a last
minute compromise. The meeting concluded with the Ambassador
and Vasquez agreeing to stay in touch. 4. (C) Comment: The military has found itself between a rock
and a hard place, being ordered by their commander-in-chief
to carry out an order ruled illegal by an appellate court.
They have decided to push back and insist that Honduran
politicians reach a consensus that removes the military from
this dilemma. That they have made these threats is both a
sign of the severity of the situation. Nevertheless, we do
not/not believe that military leaders have any intention of
actually moving against the legitimate government, at this
time. We are actively engaged with all key actors and will
continue to monitor their situation while encouraging
Honduran politicians to reach an equitable solution.
LLORENS =======================CABLE ENDS============================

El embajador estadounidense era consciente de los problemas para llegar a acuerdos entre Zelaya y sus opositores. Él mismo había organizado cuatro reuniones –el 17, 19, 20 y 22 de junio- en su residencia para tratar que el presidente se pusiera de acuerdo con los líderes del Partido Liberal y formar un consenso sobre la consulta del 28 de junio. El mismo 25 de junio, Llorens daba cuenta en el cable 214001 al Departamento de Estado en Washington D.C. que había “instado a Zelaya acancelar los comicios y alentado a otros líderes políticos y militares para mantener la calma”. A pesar de ello y tras las reuniones, la embajada tenía claro que Zelaya no estaba dispuesto a ceder ante sus opositores aun cuando la consulta del 28 de junio hubiera sido declarada ilegal.

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date: 6/25/2009 16:51
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000495

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, KDEM, HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAN PRESIDENT FIRES MILITARY JOINT CHIEF;
MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND OTHER MILITARY LEADERSHIP RESIGN

REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 489
B. TEGUCIGALPA 474
C. TEGUCIGALPA 465
D. TEGUCIGALPA 462
E. STATE 61160
F. TEGUCIGALPA 438 AND PREVIOUS

TEGUCIGALP 00000495 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reason 1.4 (B & D)

1. (C) Summary. President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya fired the
Military Joint Chief General Romeo Vasquez the evening of
June 24 after the latter refused to carry out an order to
provide support for the June 28 poll to support a November
referendum on constitutional reform, a poll ruled illegal by
a Honduran appellate court. The rest of the military
leadership then resigned, followed by Minister of Defense
Edmundo Orellana. Zelaya then called for a rally of social
groups that support him at the Presidential Palace for noon
on June 25. Attorney General Luis Alberto Rubi issued a
statement calling the firing illegal and said he would seek a
court order reinstating Vasquez. The Honduran Congress and
Supreme Court have been called into session. The breakdown
followed the failure of Honduran political leaders to reach
an accord on the wording for a June 28 poll. Though major
Liberal Party leaders met in four meetings between June 17
and 22, hosted by the Ambassador, they were unable to reach
an agreement on wording of the poll so that all would accept
its legality. Following the end of the talks, those opposed
to the poll prepared legislation (not requiring presidential
approval to become law) that would have supported court
findings of its illegality, but permit the military to
provide logistical support without sanctions, thereby
removing pressure from the military. Congress membership,
however, refused to support the bill. End summary.

2. (C) President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya fired the Military Joint
Chief General Romeo Vasquez the evening of June 24 after the
latter refused to carry out an order to provide support for
the June 28 poll to support a November referendum on
constitutional reform, a poll ruled illegal by a Honduran
appellate court. Vasquez confirmed to DATT that he had been
fired as he would not carry out an "illegal" order. Vasquez
issued a statement urging the military to remain calm and to
follow orders. The rest of the military leadership then
resigned, followed by Minister of Defense Edmundo Orellana, a
loyal supporter of Zelaya's Orellana told the Ambassador that
Zelaya had asked him to stay but that he replied that he
could not do so with the military leadership resigning.

3. (C) Zelaya announced the firing and resignations in a
short nationally broadcast speech and called for left-wing
social groups that support him to gather at the Presidential
Palace at noon (2 p.m. EDST) on June 25. Meanwhile, Attorney
General Luis Alberto Rubi issued a statement calling the
firing illegal and said he would seek a court order
reinstating Vasquez. The Congress has been called back into
session and the Supreme Court issued a statement saying it
was meeting.

4. (C) The breakdown followed the failure of talks between
Liberal Party leaders to forge a consensus on the June 28
poll. Following up on President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya's
request to host a meeting between him and fellow Liberal
Party leaders to restart a dialogue between them (reftel F),
the Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, following instructions
given in reftel E, hosted four meetings at his residence the
evenings of June 17, 19, 20 and 22. One side was represented
by Zelaya, while the other former President Carlos Flores.
The talks quickly focused on the wording of the June 28 poll,
which specifically called for a constituent assembly. Flores
argued that the reason the courts had ruled the poll illegal
was that it specifically called for such an assembly, which

TEGUCIGALP 00000495 002.2 OF 002


legally could only be done by a referendum approved by the
Congress. Flores, through a series of proposals, attempted
to get Zelaya to accept a text without reference to a
constituent assembly, instead suggesting that he accept text
that called for a referendum that would reform the
constitution, leaving the method in which this was done up to
Congress when it drafted the wording for the referendum.
Flores argued that it was in the President's interest to find
a way to have the poll legalized, as two judges had already
ruled against it. In particular, legalization would ease the
pressure on the military which had been ordered by Zelaya to
provide logistical support to the poll and ordered by the
courts not to do so. The talks succeeded in restoring a
degree of camaraderie among those present. Zelaya
tentatively agreed to accept new wording three times, but
each time backed down, claiming pressure from left-wing
social groups.

5. (C) Throughout the talks, Flores had privately indicated
to the Ambassador that in absence of an agreement, he and his
allies had an "option B" that revolved around a legislative
solution to the military's predicament. After it became
clear that there would not be an agreement, Flores met with
the Ambassador and DCM the evening of June 23 and described
the plan. He showed us draft legislation that would provide
legal cover for the military to carry out logistical support
for the poll, while maintaining the poll's illegality.
Flores explained that there were three types of legislation
that could become law without presidential approval; one of
these concerned executive branch conduct; he said that this
legislation would be passed under that category. He added
that he had already received approval of the legislation from
Liberal Party Leaders and from National Party leader and
presidential candidate Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo, and that he
believed it would be passed. However, both Liberal and
National Party Congressional members revolted against the
idea on June 24 and it did not pass.

6. (C) Comment: The current situation remains fluid. We have
urged Zelaya to cancel the poll, and encouraged other
political and military leaders to remain calm. In the talks
on the poll, Flores, Santos, and Micheletti represented the
establishment and emphasized the need to follow the rules of
the game, while Zelaya espoused populist rhetoric, arguing
that the country needed fundamental change in order to
develop. While only the Embassy had the influence needed to
bring the two sides together, in the end it was apparent that
Zelaya was not willing to make the compromises necessary to
reach an agreement.
LLORENS =======================CABLE ENDS============================